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BACKGROUND TO HALLIBURTON II
For over twenty-five years, defrauded investors’ ability to invoke a
presumption of reliance on the integrity of the market has been the
linchpin for class certification of securities fraud class actions. The
concept that defendants’ misrepresentations create a “fraud on the
market” (“FOM”) was first coined nearly fifty years ago by Abe
Pomerantz, the pioneer of shareholder rights litigation, in Herbst v.
Able.1

* The author is the Managing Partner, Pomerantz LLP which specializes in representing
investors in class action securities fraud lawsuits, and is an officer of the Institute of Law and
Economic Policy (“ILEP”) at which several of the papers cited herein were first presented. The
author wishes to thank his colleagues at the firm who assisted in preparation and review of this
article (including Patrick Dahlstrom, Jeremy Lieberman, Michael Wernke, Emma Gilmore, and
Ann Marie Cavener), as well as Dean Michael Kaufman of Loyola University Chicago School of
Law, at whose 2014 Institute for Investor Protection Conference the issues presented in this Paper
were discussed.
1. 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Origination of “fraud on the market” by Abe Pomerantz
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“The relevant impact of the misrepresentations was on the market. It
was the artificially heightened market price, pure and simple, which
operated on plaintiffs and other members of the class to induce
conversion.” If plaintiffs can prevail in their “fraud on the market”
theory, this may be sufficient to sustain a recovery under Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act . . . .2

Courts struggling to fashion a tool for class-wide proof of reliance
thereafter embraced the FOM concept.3
A socialist at heart, Abe would have been appalled when academics,
and then courts, linked FOM to the “Efficient Market Hypothesis”
(“EMH”) posited by Eugene Fama of the Chicago School of Economics
and disciple of Milton Friedman.4 Daniel Fischel first proposed the
FOM/EMH marriage, just before joining the University of Chicago
School of Law: “In an efficient capital market, such as American stock
markets, however, the market price of a firm’s stock will reflect all
available information about the firm’s prospects. Because the market
price itself transmits all available information, investors have no
incentive to study other available data.”5
The Supreme Court thereafter consecrated FOM/EMH in Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson: “Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm
Congress’ premise that the market price of shares traded on welldeveloped markets reflects all publicly available information, and,
hence, any material misrepresentations.”6
As Professor Donald Langevoort observed, Basic’s recognition of a
was confirmed by Professor Jill Fisch in The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After
Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 907 (2013).
2. Herbst, 47 F.R.D. at 16 (citations omitted).
3. In 1975, Judge Koelsch of the Ninth Circuit stated:
Proof of subjective reliance on particular misrepresentations is unnecessary to establish
a 10b-5 claim for a deception inflating the price of stock traded in the open market.
Proof of reliance is adduced to demonstrate the causal connection between the
defendant’s wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s loss. We think causation is adequately
established in the impersonal stock exchange context by proof of purchase and of the
materiality of misrepresentations, without direct proof of reliance. Materiality
circumstantially establishes the reliance of some market traders and hence the inflation
in the stock price—when the purchase is made the causational chain between
defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s loss is sufficiently established to make out a prima
facie case.
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
4. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970) (linking the “fraud on the market” theory to the “efficient market
hypothesis”).
5. Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving
Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 (1982) (footnote omitted).
6. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). Fischel’s article was cited in support of
this observation at 485 U.S. at 246 n.24.
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class-wide presumption of reliance, based on proof of a well developed,
rapidly reactive market, was an act of “juristic grace.”7 But the grant
was not unanimous. Justice White’s dissent reads like a “juristic curse,”
which we will see haunted FOM/EMH from its inception:
The federal courts have proved adept at developing an evolving
jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5 in such a manner. But with no staff
economists, no experts schooled in the “efficient-capital-market
hypothesis,” no ability to test the validity of empirical market studies,
we are not well equipped to embrace novel constructions of a statute
based on contemporary microeconomic theory.8

Thereafter, some commentators asserted that the FOM/EMH
marriage enabled securities fraud class actions to proliferate.9 This was
mildly ironic (though highly questionable), given that hitching EMH to
securities fraud class actions was aimed at rationalizing, if not
restraining, recoverable damages.10
In response to the increased number of securities class actions,
Congress sought to reign them in by way of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), Class Action Fairness Act
(“CAFA”), and Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(“SLUSA”). Nonetheless, as incidents of fraudulent misconduct
exponentially increased, so too did securities fraud class actions.11
“Reform” efforts thereafter shifted from Congress to the courts, as
the Supreme Court raised the bar for pleading misleading statements12
7. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 151, 161.
8. Basic, 485 U.S. at 253 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
9. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 499–501 (1991) (arguing that settlements in securities fraud
class actions are neither voluntary nor accurate through studying a group of securities class
actions involving similar claims of fraud in initial public offerings); Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 56 (1991) (assessing
the effectiveness of shareholder litigation as an incentive-alignment device by examining lawsuits
brought against a randomly selected sample of publicly traded firms over several decades).
10. See Fischel, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that “fraud on the market” cases form the basis for
rejection of the traditional method of determining injury and damages in open-market trading
cases in favor of a more realistic economic approach).
11. See, e.g., In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Enron
Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 258 F. Supp. 2d 576 (S.D. Tex. 2003). These cases
involved massive accounting frauds that resulted in multi-billion dollar settlements for the benefit
of defrauded investors. The size of the frauds prompted adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which increased corporate accountability by requiring, among other things, that senior officers
certify not only reported results, but also the adequacy of internal financial controls.
12. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that the “plausibility” standard,
for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to satisfy the short-and-plain-statement
requirement, is not akin to probability requirement, but asks for more than sheer possibility that
the defendant acted unlawfully).
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and loss causation.13 However, securities fraud class action procedures
remained relatively unscathed as the Court deferred the determination of
loss causation and materiality from class certification to summary
judgment.14
I. THE “UNANIMOUS” HALLIBURTON II DECISION
Nonetheless, it was with great trepidation that the class action bar
viewed the Supreme Court’s interest in revisiting the FOM/EMH
marriage when it granted certiorari for Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John
Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”) in late 2013. The threat of an annulment
loomed large, given the possibility that a strict textualist approach (such
as that espoused by Justice Scalia in Morrison v. Australia National
Bank Ltd.15) could reopen the genie bottle and give the current, more
conservative court the chance to adopt Justice White’s dissent in Basic.
The concerns were heightened by the fact that the EMH was now under
assault not just by jurists, but also by behavioral economists who
insisted that investors, and hence markets, were rarely rational or
efficient. These experts cited “irrational exuberance,” “bubbles,” and
volatile “mood like” swings of market prices. It was clearly ironic that
the 2013 Nobel Award for Economics had been awarded to Eugene
Fama for proposing EMH, as well as to Robert Schiller, for debunking
EMH.
Thus, it was with a collective sigh that the plaintiffs’ bar read the
Court’s 9–0 decision in Halliburton II,16 which re-endorsed the
presumption of reliance where plaintiffs proved “market efficiency.”17
Plaintiffs could continue to trigger the presumption of reliance by
13. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (holding that an investor
claiming securities fraud cannot satisfy the requirement of proving that the fraud caused an
economic loss simply by alleging in the complaint, and subsequently establishing, that the price
of the security on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation).
14. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013)
(determining that materiality of a corporation’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions was a
question common to all members of a class in a securities fraud action brought on a fraud-on-themarket theory, as materiality was judged according to an objective standard, and alleged
misrepresentations and omissions would be equal for all investors composing the class); Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct 2179, 2168 (2011) (holding that the
court of appeals erred by requiring Erica P. John Fund, Inc. to show loss causation as a condition
of obtaining class certification).
15. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261–62 (2010) (holding that in
terms of the scope of conduct prohibited by Rule 10b–5 and section 10(b), the text of the statute
controls).
16. 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
17. See id. at 2410 (reaffirming that Basic’s presumption of reliance does not rest on a binary
view of market efficiency, but instead that Basic recognized that market efficiency is a matter of
degree).
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demonstrating that the market for the company’s securities was
sufficiently robust (as indicated by, e.g., volume of trading the number
of market makers, and the number of analysts who followed the stock),
as well as by demonstrating that the securities reacted rapidly and in a
statistically significant amount to “new” company-specific news18
(through the use of “event studies”).19
Defendants could continue to rebut the presumption by demonstrating
that a particular investor in fact did not “rely upon the market,” but
rather had access to non-public information or otherwise utilized an
investment strategy that ignored the market entirely. However, this
license to rebut reliance had proved to be pyrrhic. The Supreme Court,
therefore, recalibrated the formula for rebuttal, enabling defendants to
demonstrate that despite the misrepresentations, the stock’s price had
not been “impacted” by the alleged misconduct.20
Frankly, Abe would not have been disappointed by this decision.
This approach more closely linked fraud with price movement.
Moreover, the decision clearly signaled a retreat from a rigidly orthodox
view of efficient markets. The Court expressly rejected the “robust
view of market efficiency” espoused by the petitioners,21 and instead
endorsed the view that the presumption of reliance could be triggered by
a showing that the stock traded in a “generally” efficient manner. As
Chief Justice Roberts observed, the question of a market’s efficiency
was not a yes or no “binary” question, but rather more a spectrum
analysis:
The markets for some securities are more efficient than the markets
for others, and even a single market can process different kinds of
information more or less efficiently, depending on how widely the
information is disseminated and how easily it is understood. . . . Basic
recognized that market efficiency is a matter of degree . . . .22

The Court also placed the burden of proving lack of price impact
squarely on the defendants.23 Arguably, this will require defendants to
18. Lax v. First Merchs. Acceptance Corp., 170 No. 97 C 2715, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11866, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1997).
19. Jonathan R Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991) (using event studies
to determine whether false information caused a security to trade at an artificially high or low
price).
20. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417 (“[D]efendants must be afforded an opportunity
before class certification to defeat the presumption through evidence that an alleged
misrepresentation did not actually affect the market price of the stock.”).
21. Id. at 2409.
22. Id. at 2409–10.
23. See id. at 2417 (“Defendants may seek to defeat the Basic presumption at [the
certification] stage through direct as well as indirect price impact evidence.”).
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demonstrate at a ninety-five percent level of confidence that the market
was not “impacted” by either of any of the “events,” i.e., the
misstatements or corrections thereof, because that is the same burden
plaintiffs must meet to demonstrate “efficiency.” Stated otherwise, so
long as there is evidence of some impact—enough to preclude
defendants’ experts from opining with “statistical certainty” that there
was no impact—plaintiffs should be able to thwart rebuttal efforts.
The Court also arguably settled the issue of whether index investors
(i.e., those who invest in bundles of securities in an effort to imitate, but
not beat, the market) can be deemed to have “relied on the market”:
As we recently explained, Basic concluded only that “it is reasonable
to presume that most investors—knowing that they have little hope of
outperforming the market in the long run based solely on their analysis
of publicly available information—will rely on the security’s market
price as an unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light of all
public information.”24

Especially significant, the Court also opened the door to class
certification even where plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate efficiency:
“A misrepresentation can distort a stock market’s price even in a
generally inefficient market . . . .”25 In so doing, the Court echoed a
position pitched by academics that was cited in page thirty-nine of the
Petitioners Brief: “if a company is trading in a market in which there are
significant deviations from efficiency but the evidence shows fraudulent
distortion in the situation actually at issue in the litigation, our approach
would result in classwide reliance.”26
Thus, “fraud on the market” has now come full circle since Abe’s
original insight, with price impact now restored to the formula to satisfy
class-wide reliance by demonstrating that ‘defendants’ deceptive
statements distorted the price of the stock in question, though now
defendants would need to demonstrate the absence of such distortion.
II. WHAT’S NEXT
Upon closer examination, there are now solutions to many of the
conundrums observed by Professor Donald Langevoort in his oft-cited
“Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market,” e.g., delays in the

24. Id. at 2411 (citing Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192
(2013)).
25. Id. at 2409.
26. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. LAW. 671, 690 (2014); see
Brief for Petitioners at 39, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct.
2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (citing the Bebchuck & Ferrell study for posing a price-distortion test
and providing examples of price distortion in inefficient markets).
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stock’s reaction to new corporate specific information despite the fact
that the securities were listed on “efficient markets” such as the New
York Stock Exchange.27
A. Measuring General Efficiency/Impact—Event Studies
and Rapidity of Responses
Shortly after Basic, academics advocated borrowing tools developed
by econometricians to measure the “efficiency” of the market for
particular stocks.28 In time, a cadre of experts emerged to battle at the
class motion stage over whether market prices reacted sufficiently, if at
all, to company-specific information, particularly where that
information was “new” or different from what was expected.
According to the academics, not only was the degree of the reaction
important, but so too was its rapidity, because the classic EMH model
hypothesized that in a well-developed market, prices reacted so quickly
that “value investors” and analysts could not beat the market.
Such studies clearly added costs to litigation. However, anyone who
has conducted market price analyses for antitrust class actions will
likely view securities-market event studies as a bargain. Among other
things, the number of variables is far less.
Post-Halliburton II, plaintiffs will seize upon the Court’s rejection of
the “robust” efficiency model in favor of a more relaxed “generally”
efficient model. It bears repeating that the Court recognized that “a
single market can process different kinds of information more or less
efficiently, depending on how widely the information is disseminated
and how easily it is understood,” and that a value investor “implicitly
relies on the fact that a stock’s market price will eventually reflect
material information . . . .”29
This observation should help drive different outcomes than those like
In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities Litigation,30 where the company was
buried in an S-1 filing stating that a major subsidiary had previously
overstated revenues. This news went unnoticed by analysts, and there
was no contemporaneous stock price reaction.31 Several weeks later, a
Wall Street Journal reporter identified and quantified the overstatement,

27. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 161.
28. See Macey et al., supra note 19, at 1028–35 (describing the methods to measure how
much a stock price reacts to news).
29. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409, 2411 (emphasis added).
30. 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005).
31. See id. at 264 (discussing the factual background that led to the claims that Merck & Co.
had committed securities fraud and made material misstatements or omissions in the registration
of statements).
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resulting in an immediate and significant stock price decline.32
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit held that such a delayed response would
not be consistent with an efficient market.33
This reasoning was recently echoed in Bricklayers & Trowel Trades
International Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC,34
where the First Circuit held that a price reaction following an analyst’s
change of recommendation (based on analysis of previously issued
information) was not consistent with the EMH: “Accordingly, once a
misstatement or corrective disclosure is publicly known in an efficient
market, courts will assume that the stock price reacts immediately, and
any claim that an event moved the stock price when the event was not
actually a new disclosure will necessarily fail.”35
Post Halliburton II, a statistically significant price reaction should be
sufficient regardless of whether the reaction followed the initial
announcement of the news or occurred sometime later when an analysis
turned the “spotlight” on the company’s financial condition.
B. Price Maintenance/Confirmatory Lies
There should be little doubt that in advocating for consideration of
“price impact” at the certification stage, defendants hoped to bury
securities fraud class actions because stock prices often do not move in
response to the initial dissemination of fraudulent statements. However,
this misstates the issue—merely because a stock price does not move or
react does not mean that it has not been “distorted” by defendants’
misconduct.
By way of example, assume that a company knows that analysts are
expecting earnings of $1.10 per share. However, as the quarter closes,
management identifies only $1.00 of reportable earnings. Nonetheless,
through accounting machinations, the company reports $1.10 earnings
per share, thereby meeting market expectations. In the absence of any
earnings “surprise,” the market price will likely remain the same and be
“maintained” by the “confirmatory lie.” As noted by Bebchuk and
Ferrell, “[i]n such a situation, the confirmatory lie might prevent a stock
price drop that would have occurred had the truth been told.”36
Further, assume that this pattern of meeting market expectations by
32. See id. at 265 (stating that immediately after the Wall Street Journal article, Merck’s stock
lost $2.22 billion and that six days later Merck announced it was postponing the Medco IPO).
33. See id. at 269–71 (discussing the facts of the case and the relation to “the efficient
market”).
34. 752 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2014).
35. Id. at 89 (footnote omitted).
36. Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 26, at 692.
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inflating earnings ten percent to meet analyst expectations continues for
the entire year, thus precluding any price movement in connection with
reported earnings. However, at the end of the year, the auditors blow
the whistle and the company is forced to admit that it overstated
reported earnings by ten percent. The market will likely react by a
significant decline, often in excess of ten percent. This decline clearly
evidences the impact defendants’ misconduct had upon the stock price
all along. As Bebchuk and Ferrell observed, the price reaction when the
market “learned the truth about the misstatement—that is, at the time of
a corrective disclosure . . . could be relevant to the question of whether
the misstatement at the time it was made resulted in fraudulent
distortion (even if it was a confirmatory lie).”37
Thus, experts will need to consider not only whether the price moved
at the time of the original announcement, but the market expectations at
the time. Moreover, so long as the price moves significantly at the time
of the corrective disclosure, and the correction clearly relates to a series
of prior statements, “impact” should be evident.38
The confirmatory lie and price maintenance issue was recently
addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery &
Food Employees Welfare Fund v. Regions Financial Corp.39 The
plaintiffs asserted that the defendants’ false statements simply
confirmed the market’s existing expectations about the company,
thereby artificially maintaining the price of the stock.40 As a result,
none of the alleged misleading statements were accompanied by stock
price increases.41 The lone significant stock price change occurred
following revelation of the fraud at the end of the class period.42
37. Id.
38. Defendants will undoubtedly argue that merely because a company announces that it must
restate earnings for three years does not mean the price was distorted by the same amount for the
entire three years. However, this is more an issue of measuring damages that trigger a
presumption of reliance. For instance, in In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-2185, 2014
WL 2112823, at *12 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2014), the court denied class certification for investors
who purchased BP shares prior to the Deepwater Horizon explosion on grounds that they could
not credibly argue that the degree to which BP’s stock price had been distorted by
misrepresentation of its safety record was equivalent to the price drop when the explosion
occurred. The court reasoned that “manifestation” of the previously concealed degree of the
safety risk triggered a much larger price reaction than full disclosure of that risk would have. Id.;
see David Tabak, Risk Disclosures and Damages Measurement in Securities Fraud Cases, 21
SEC. REFORM ACT LITIG. REP. 6 (2006) (examining some of the issues relevant to determining
the amount of artificial inflation in a stock price when the possible disclosure was only of a risk
of an event that was later realized).
39. 762 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2014).
40. Id. at 1252.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Addressing market efficiency, the Eleventh Circuit refused to adopt
any “mandatory analytical framework for market efficiency
inquiries.”43 In language reminiscent of Halliburton II’s rejection of a
“robust” view of market efficiency, the court explained that “[e]ven . . .
general signs of an efficient market may not be required for a finding of
an efficient market in every case. Stocks that trade on a smaller scale,
or that are not widely followed, might trade on an efficient market.”44
The court expressly rejected the defendant’s argument “that a finding
of market efficiency always requires proof that the alleged
misrepresentations had an immediate effect on the stock price.”45 It
observed that the lack of stock price movements in response to
confirmatory misrepresentations was completely consistent with an
efficient market,46 and that a single decline following the corrective
disclosure could be sufficient.47
C. Confounding Events
No doubt defendants’ counsels have long been cognizant of the perils
of corrective disclosure, and have actively counseled clients how best to
buffer their impact by orchestrating “soft landings” of such adverse
news. One tack is to bundle the disclosure of past misconduct (the need
to restate historical results) with other news (lowered forecasts due to
competitive changes), thereby complicating measurement of the
imbedded distortion. Leakage is undoubtedly another tool. (Michael
Furchtgott and Frank Partnoy have conducted a study of soft
landings.48)
Regardless, economists’ toolboxes contain several devices for
disentangling these “confounding” events as discussed below.

43. Id. at 1255.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1256.
46. Id.
47. The Court remanded the case to enable defendants to rebut impact. Id. at 1259. The
decision represents an “about-face” for the Eleventh Circuit, which had previously expressed an
extremely rigid view of market efficiency. For example, in 2013, in Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d
1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2013), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of a complaint for failure to
adequately plead loss causation, holding that an analyst’s new examination of previously
disclosed facts could never be a corrective disclosure, noting that “[e]ither the market is efficient
or it is not.” This prior view of market efficiency cannot be reconciled with Halliburton II’s
proclamation that “Basic’s presumption of reliance . . . does not rest on a ‘binary’ view of market
efficiency.” 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2410 (2014).
48. Michael Furchtgott & Frank Partnoy, Disclosure Strategies and Shareholder Litigation
Risk: Evidence from Restatements (May 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2012/furchtgott_partnoy.pdf.
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D. “Response Coefficients”
One methodology for disaggregating the impact of bundled news
items was proposed by Esther Bruegger and Fred Dunbar.49 The
authors cited studies regarding “earnings response coefficients”
(“ERC”), i.e., mathematical factors that can account for the relationship
of a restatement of earnings to the likely price response.50 Once the
ERC factor has been computed, the portion of a stock price reaction
attributable to the restatement can be isolated from other confounding
news.51
The authors gave an example of a situation where, during the
subprime mortgage meltdown, a company confidently asserted in midMarch 2008 that its mortgage portfolio was fine, only to turn around
two weeks later and announce that a significant writedown was in fact
necessary. The authors further hypothesized that simultaneous with
announcement of the need to writedown the mortgage portfolio, the
Company also disclosed an earnings shortfall for the prior year ended
December 31, 2007 that totaled $1.50 per share (which presumably was
due to factors unrelated to the portfolio writedown). In response to this
disclosure of new “confounding” information, some of which was
arguably fraud related (the belated portfolio writedown) and some of
which arguably non-fraud related (the earnings shortfall for the prior
year results), the stock price dropped $10 per share.52
The problem presented to a financial market expert was how to
separate the impact of the two sources of information, and assign a
portion of the $10 decline to each. The solution proposed by Bruegger
and Dunbar was as follows:
[T]he event study on March 30, 2008 does not by itself allow one to
determine the price decline exclusively due to the disclosure of the
misrepresentation.

49. See Esther Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with
Response Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 11, 12 (2009) (showing how “statistical analysis of the
response of both share prices and investor expectations to new information can be used to
improve the estimation of damages in shareholder litigation”).
50. See, e.g., id. at 31 n.65 (citing Ray Ball & S. P. Kothari, Security Returns Around
Earnings Announcements, 66 ACCT. REV. 718 (1991)); id. at 33 n.74 (citing Robert L. Hagerman,
Mark E. Zmijewski & Pravin Shah, The Association Between the Magnitude of Quarterly
Earnings Forecast Errors and Risk-Adjusted Stock Returns, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 526 (1984)); id. at
33 n.76 (citing Walter R. Teets & Charles R. Wasley, Estimating Earnings Response
Coefficients: Pooled Versus Firm-Specific Models, 21 J. ACCT. & ECON. 279 (1996)).
51. See id. at 35–36 (using ERCs to calculate price reactions).
52. See id. at 35 (demonstrating the application of response coefficients in a simplified
situation).
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Instead we can make use of the academic research on price
reactions in response to earnings announcements, which provides us
with a technique to calculate the price reaction due to the $1.50
earnings disappointment. The technique uses the concept of an
earnings response coefficient, or ERC . . . .
Let us assume that either through a regression analysis or from the
professional literature, we can infer that [the Company] has an ERC of
5[x] over the relevant time period. This implies that for every cent of
an earnings surprise its stock reacts by five cents.53

Under this methodology, $7.50 of the $10 price drop would be
attributable to the earnings surprise ($1.50 x 5) and the balance of the
decline, and the remaining $2.50 would be attributable to the subprime
writedown.
E. Forward-Casting
Another analytic tool is to construct the “counterfactual” of how
much the stock price would have reacted had the truth been told rather
than the confirmatory lie. Thus, going back to the ten percent earnings
inflation above, assume that the stock was trading at a price/earnings
ratio of 15x. If the earnings were inflated to $1.10, the expected stock
price would be $16.50. Had the company reported only $1.00 per share,
the stock price would likely have been $15.00 (assuming for the
moment that there was no decline in the “price earnings” ratio).54
Hence, the amount by which the stock traded above $15 (in this case
$1.50) would be the measure of distortion at the time of the
wrongdoing.
Thus, upon announcement of the misstatement, it would be
reasonable to expect that at least $1.50 (or ten percent) of the decline
could be attributed to the original misconduct. Any additional decline
beyond $1.50 could be attributed to other factors, though plaintiffs will
likely argue that such additional decline is due to reassessment of the
“integrity of management.”55
F. Content Analysis
A third means of disaggregating factors that contributed to the price
decline is to identify key words in the company’s press release and
analyst reports relating to the fraud and to other subjects, and to

53. Id.
54. The price earnings ratio is the multiple of reported earnings at which a stock trades, e.g., if
the company reported $1 per share earnings and traded at $10 per share, its “p/e” ratio would be
10x.
55. See infra Part II.H.

GROSS PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

3/29/2015 2:00 PM

The Road Map For Class Certification

497

apportion the price decline consistent with the ratio by which those
terms appear.56 This content methodology was endorsed in N.A.A.C.P.
v. AcuSport, Inc.57:
[An expert’s] opinions were largely based on a study that he
performed using “content analysis.” [The expert] and several of his
research assistants reviewed documents and deposition testimony from
the various defendants in an attempt to draw inferences as to which
defendants did or did not employ any one of 14 “countermarketing”
strategies [the expert] had identified. The results of this analysis were
presented to the jury on charts that were useful and reliable in
supporting his conclusions.58

G. “Intent to Induce” Reliance
When faced with confounding information, plaintiffs should also
demand discovery of investor-relations personnel to demonstrate that
the confounding was deliberately orchestrated to thwart demonstration
of price impact. For instance, a company may have uncovered the need
to restate prior earnings, but waited to disclose that fact until it could
also report the loss of a future contract that would have required
lowered forecasts as well.59
This approach would be consistent with proof under the common law
of “intent to induce reliance” (which is different from “intent to
deceive” or scienter). It is the one element of the common-law tort of
fraudulent misrepresentation that has not been incorporated into the
federal securities laws.60 The common law required proof that a
company had a “reason to expect” investors would act in reliance on its
56. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfactual Keys to Causation and Damages in
Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 199, 242 (“When available, the most
telling information is often contained in analyst reports following the disclosure.”); David Tabak,
Making Assessments About Materiality Less Subjective Through the Use of Content Analysis 11
(NERA, Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://www.nera.com/publications/archive/
2007/making-assessments-about-materiality-less-subjective-through-the.html (discussing how
analyst report headlines are examined).
57. 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
58. Id. at 515.
59. A scenario similar to this played out years ago involving a company that was sued by our
firm for securities fraud. The company internally identified side contracts that effectively
converted sales into consignments, but did not make a disclosure (it claimed), because it was still
investigating whether or not the practice was widespread. Before announcing any need to restate,
the company disclosed the loss of a major contract, which drove its stock price down
considerably. By the time the need to restate was announced, most of the inflation had already
been removed from stock price.
60. All the elements of the common law tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, other than intent
to induce reliance, have been incorporated in the proof of federal securities law violations under
Rule 10(b). See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 165
(2008).
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misstatements, i.e., the company had “information that would lead a
reasonable man to conclude that there is an especial likelihood that it
will reach those persons and will influence their conduct.”61
Evidence of such intent to induce reliance should be considered in
determining whether defendants’ conduct distorted the market price. It
stands to reason that companies should be held accountable if they
knowingly managed the release of news in the hopes of obscuring any
distortion attributable thereto, whether to meet analyst expectations or
to blunt the impact of corrective revelations. In this regard, any delay in
the release of adverse news, or deliberate combination with other
information, should be a red flag.
H. Investors’ Reliance on the “Integrity of Management”
In analyzing confounding events, it is also important to factor the
market’s risk assessment of the stock. It has long been recognized that
market-price reactions to earnings restatements are often
disproportionate to the size of the restatement.62 Indeed, if one were to
recast the actual earnings over the restated period, and use the same
price/earnings multiplier, the reconstructed “true value” price of the
stock would likely be quite different from the price reconstructed based
on the price drop following the corrective disclosure. In other words, if
the company had been forthright in the first instance, the stock would
have been lower, but not as low as indicated by the post-corrective
price.
The larger reaction to a corrective disclosure clearly involves an
additional factor—the market’s perception of management’s reliability.
After all, stock pricing is a function of future returns, the assessment of
which requires confidence in management. As Professor Langevoort
observed: “[p]resumably, most stock-price declines that follow a
surprise revelation of fraud reflect not only the truth with respect to the
specific facts misrepresented or omitted but also a readjustment in
expectations regarding other matters on which management was

61. Ernst & Young, LLP v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex. 2001) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 cmt. d (1977)); see Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
“ERISA” Litig. v. Enron Corp., Nos. H-01-3624, G-03-0481, 2010 WL 9077875, at *46 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 19, 2010) (applying Restatement § 531 to sustain fraud allegations in connection with
open market purchases made in reliance on SEC filings because there was “an especial likelihood
that SEC-filed [information] . . . will reach and influence potential investors to purchase the
company’s stock”); Berkowitz v. Baron, 428 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding that
the plaintiffs were in the class of persons that was reasonably expected to rely on the statements).
62. See Bruegger & Dunbar, supra note 49, at 34 (“For a growth stock, the first announcement
could be expected to have a disproportionately larger effect than subsequent announcements.”).
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previously thought credible.”63
Bruegger and Dunbar also acknowledge that this loss of confidence
by the market contributes to the price reaction:
[I]t is likely that the earnings response coefficient is not constant if
there are multiple earnings surprises resulting from disclosures of false
accounting. For a growth stock, the first announcement could
expected to have a disproportionately larger effect than subsequent
announcements. . . . This is because the initial price reaction would
include a component that reassesses the risk of ensuing bad news.64

Indeed, it is well established in the finance literature that the
ramifications of financial fraud extend well beyond the direct dollar
amount of the fraud, but also cause further loss on account of damage to
a company’s reputation:
Risk/uncertainty likely increases and future prospects may well
decrease when management integrity and competence are called into
question.
...
Because fraud means intentional, non-GAAP financial reporting, it
indicates a lack of management integrity that we expect to be
associated with a more negative stock price reaction, incremental to
any other impacts from revising reported results. This may be due to
an increase in the discount rate because fraud creates uncertainty about
the reliability and credibility of management representations, which
increases the perceived information asymmetry between management
and stockholders.
...
Our results suggest a greater investor concern over restatements that
carry negative implications for management integrity than those due to
more technical accounting issues.65

Other studies have quantified the impact of management “reputation”
on the value of securities.
One study quantified the impact of reputational impairment on the
price of company stocks: “For each dollar that a firm misleadingly
inflates its market value, on average, it loses this dollar when its
misconduct is revealed,” plus an additional $2.71, due to reputation
loss.66 As the authors noted:

63. Langevoort, supra note 7, at 183 n.140.
64. Bruegger & Dunbar, supra note 49, at 34.
65. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose et al., Determinants of Market Reactions to Restatement
Announcements, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 59, 63, 87 (2004).
66. Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the
Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 581 (2008).
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Reputation can be lost if customers change the terms on which they
are willing to do business with the firm because of an increased
probability of cheating or the perception that the firm cannot support
warranties or supply compatible parts in the future. Diminished
reputation also can reflect an increase in the firm’s cost of capital or
trade credit, as input suppliers change the terms with which they do
business with the firm. In addition, the firm can suffer real losses as
managers are required to divert resources to the investigation and
away from company business. The revelation of financial reporting
problems could also force the firm to implement new monitoring and
control policies, increasing the cost of operations. We group all such
real effects on firm value into the reputation loss.67

Thus, investors should be entitled to recover this additional decline
attributable to the market’s reassessment of management’s “risk.” Just
as courts have consistently recognized investors’ entitlement to rely
upon the “integrity of the market,” so too should investors be entitled to
rely upon the “integrity of management.”
Indeed, courts have been moving in that direction.68 Indeed,
“[i]nvestors have a right to know––and would reasonably consider it
important––when the head of a publicly-owned company is stealing any
quantity of money from their company.”69
The SEC has officially embraced this view: “[T]he tone set by top
management––the corporate environment or culture within which
financial reporting occurs––is the most significant factor contributing to
the integrity of the financial reporting process.”70 So too has the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”): Auditing standards
require that “[f]raud involving senior management . . . should be
67. Id. at 598–99 (footnote omitted).
68. See S.E.C. v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2010 WL 4615336, at *8 (D. Neb. Nov. 4, 2010)
(“Investors may base their investment decisions, at least in part, on factors such as . . .
management ethics and accountability.”); Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 370–73
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding resignation of CEO material where CEO brings “‘peculiarly valuable
technical or business expertise to the company’” and the stock drops after resignation
announcement (citing In re Numerex Corp. Sec. Litig., 913 F. Supp. 391, 401 (E.D. Pa. 1996))).
69. S.E.C. v. Pace, 173 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2001); accord. AUSA Life Ins. Co. v.
Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 237 (2d Cir. 2000) (Winter, J., dissenting) (finding that had the
truth been told, the plaintiffs would have realized management’s lack of credibility so that
consequences of the dishonesty are within the zone of proximate cause); United States v.
Hatfield, 724 F. Supp. 2d 321, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Here, a reasonable jury could find that [the
defendant] spent millions of dollars of shareholders’ money on his personal expenses, without
proper authorization to do so. . . . This more than suffices to meet the Government’s materiality
burden.”); see also Dunbar & Sen, supra note 56, at 237–38; Langevoort, supra note 7, at 183
n.140.
70. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, Materiality, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150, 45155 (Aug. 19,
1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211(B)), cited in Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co, 228 F.3d
154, 163 (2d Cir. 2000).
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reported directly to the audit committee in a timely manner . . . .”71
CONCLUSION—NEW MATH AND THE “UNANIMOUS DECISION”
Thus, the landscape for securities fraud class actions has been altered,
though there is an element of “déjà vu all over again” with the addition
(or return) of price impact to the analysis. The decision will certainly
keep testifying experts busy for the foreseeable future, and keep
practitioners and judges scratching their heads as they attempt to fathom
the “mind-numbing data.”72
Lawyers will also undoubtedly argue over Halliburton II’s 9–0 final
score. Justice Thomas’s “concurrence” was more akin to Justice
White’s dissent in Basic. If Yogi Berra were a lawyer, he might insist
that, like Roger Maris’ home run record, his vote be recorded with an
“*”.

71. PCAOB AU § 316.79, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit,” available
at http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/pages/au316.aspx.
72. Langevoort, supra note 7, at 168.

